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Recent Decisions
TORTS-MASTER-SERVANT-RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR-'"FREE TIME" As
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT-The United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania has held that whether
a professional football player was within the scope of his employ-
ment while on the "free time" granted to players during summer
camp was a material issue of fact precluding the granting of the
professional team's motion for summary judgment.
Mauk v. Wright, 367 F. Supp. 961 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
The plaintiff suffered personal injuries arising from a two car
collision. One car was driven by the plaintiff, the other by the
defendant-player, a member of the Washington Redskins football
team.' Recovery was sought from the defendant-player for his al-
leged negligence in the operation of the automobile he was driving.'
The plaintiff included the professional football team as a defendant,
contending that a master-servant relationship existed between the
player and the team and that the player was within the scope of his
employment at the time of the accident. The defendant-team
moved for summary judgment. The motion was denied.
The defendant-player was in the team's summer training camp
which annually precedes the regular National Football League sea-
son. The broad purposes of the camp were to determine the players
who would make the team's playing roster and to physically and
mentally prepare those players for the upcoming season. To this
end, various controls were placed on the players' conduct, both
while in camp and during their "free time." 3 This "free time" was
1. Mauk v. Wright, 367 F. Supp. 961, 963 (M.D. Pa. 1973). The original action was
brought by the plaintiff-driver, the sole occupant of the car, for personal injuries and by the
plaintiff-owner for the destruction of his property. Both sought recovery from defendant-
driver and defendant-car owner, two members of the Washington Redskins football team, and
from the Washington Redskins, defendant-team. For purposes of this discussion, only the
plaintiff-driver's action against the defendant-team is important. Plaintiff-driver is herein-
after referred to as plaintiff; defendant-driver, as defendant-player.
2. The case, a diversity action with a prayer for damages exceeding $10,000, met the
federal jurisdictional requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). Plaintiff was a resident of
Pennsylvania, defendant-player a resident of Virginia, and defendant-team a Maryland cor-
poration.
3. Restraints on the player's conduct during his "free time" arose from the standard
player contract, which all players in the National Football League sign, and from the training
camp rules established by the defendant-team for its own players. These restraints included
a prohibition against the players dating students of the college where the camp was estab-
lished, prohibitions against drinking intoxicants, associating with gamblers, or granting inter-
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generally about two hours a day, during which the players were
permitted to leave the camp. Nightly curfews with bed checks to
assure compliance were established as a means of terminating the
"free time." On the night of the accident, the regular curfew had
been extended thirty minutes past the conclusion of the annual
College All-Star Football Game which was televised that night.
Shortly after midnight, and before the "free time" ended, the acci-
dent occurred.
In denying defendant-team's motion for summary judgment, the
court concluded that a material issue of fact remained concerning
the relationship between the player and the football team at the
time of the accident.4 The court outlined the elements necessary to
establish the applicability of the doctrine of respondeat superior
under Pennsylvania law5 and concluded that a reasonable construc-
tion of the facts could lead to a finding that there was a master-
servant relationship between the player and the team at summer
camp. Similarly, the player could have been found by the jury to
be within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the
accident; that is, the granting of "free time" away from the rigors
of the camp could meet the requirement of benefit to the team.
Crucial to the court's denial of the motion was the finding that
the player could reasonably be found to have been within the scope
of his employment during his "free time." An indication of the
views without the defendant-team's consent, and a requirement that the players wear coats
and neckties in all public places.
4. A defendant moving for summary judgment is required to show the absence of any
genuine issue of material fact; the plaintiff must show only that his conclusion is a logical
and reasonable one. Even if plaintiff's conclusion is one of several that can be reached,
summary judgment for the defendant is precluded. See Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 821 (3d
Cir. 1968); Smith v. Bell Tel. Co., 397 Pa. 134, 138, 153 A.2d 477, 480 (1959).
5. The court stated:
We, therefore, must examine these interrelated legal questions to determine if any
reasonable construction of the facts presented by the plaintiff could support a jury's
finding that:
(1) There existed a master-servant relationship between Wright [defendant-
player] and the Washington Redskins [defendant-team];
(2) The accident complained of occurred during the course and in the scope of
Wright's employment;
(3) Wright's activities at the time of the accident rendered benefit to the employer;
(4) Wright's conduct was negligent and the proximate cause of the complained of
injuries.
The last finding (also for the jury) is not at issue for the purposes of this motion for
summary judgement.
367 F. Supp. at 966.
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defendant-team's view of its relationship with the player and the
accident was its payment of the player's medical expenses arising
from the accident. The team was contractually bound to pay the
medical expenses of any player injured in the performance of his
services.' The court concluded that payment was relevant to reveal
the defendant-team's assessment of the situation and could support
the plaintiff's view of the player's scope of employment, but that the
payment in itself was not dispositive.7
The court relied heavily on two admiralty cases, and on a case in
which a soldier injured a civilian, to draw an analogy between the
lifestyle of a professional football player and the lifestyles of seamen
and soldiers. Primarily because of their isolated and controlled life-
styles, the court concluded that granting "free time" to these
classes of individuals benefitted the employer by improving em-
ployee morale. This benefit was sufficient to raise a material issue
of fact as to whether the employees could be brought within the
scope of their employment for respondeat superior purposes. An
analysis of these cases follows.
ADMIRALTY CASE LAW
Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co.8 and Waterman Steamship Corp. v.
Jones9 were actions in admiralty for maintenance and cure, a tradi-
tional remedy for ill or injured seamen. The accident in Aguilar
occurred when the seaman was returning to his ship from shore
leave and in Waterman after the seaman had left his ship to start
shore leave. The Supreme Court expanded the coverage for mainte-
nance and cure by holding that each man was entitled to recovery
from his employer. The much-quoted reasoning emphasizes the
unique employment situation of the seaman and the necessity of
granting shore leave for the smooth functioning of a ship. The Court
6. Payment of hospital and medical care amounted to approximately $100. The contract
between defendant-player and defendant-team provided, inter alia,
In the event that Player is injured in the performance of his services under this contract
.. the Club [defendant-team) will: (1) provide, during the term of this contract, such
medical or hospital care as, in the opinion of the Club Physician, may be necessary
Id. at 969.
7. Id.
8. 318 U.S. 724 (1943).
9. Id. The Waterman case was decided with Aguilar and reported in the same opinion.
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found shore leave to be an essential element of the seaman's em-
ployment."0
An action for maintenance and cure arises from the contractual
relationship between the seaman and his ship." It is an action by
the seaman against his employer for the payment of wages to the
end of the voyage and for care to the point of maximum cure for a
sickness or injury to the seaman "in the service of his ship.' 2 A
seaman's right to maintenance and cure is not obviated by finding
him at fault, unless his actions constitute wilful misbehavior or are
deliberate acts of indiscretion; 3 mere negligence on the part of the
seaman does not forfeit his right. Aguilar classified it as among the
most pervasive of all of the seaman's remedies. When viewed in light
of the traditional status of a seaman as a "ward of the admiralty,""
and of the possibility of sickness or injury in an entirely foreign
environment, such relief is appropriate.
Following Aguilar and Waterman, seamen were granted mainte-
nance and cure for injuries sustained on shore leave while visiting a
10. The Court reasoned:
Unlike men employed in service on land, the seaman, when he finishes his day's work,
is neither relieved of obligations to his employer nor wholly free to dispose of his leisure
as he sees fit. . .In short, during the period of his tenure the vessel is not merely
his place of employment; it is the framework of his existence. For that reason, among
others, his employer's responsibility for maintenance and cure extends beyond injuries
sustained because of, or while engaged in, activities required by his employment ...
Men cannot live for long cooped up aboard ship, without substantial impairment of
their efficiency, if not also serious danger to discipline ...
No master would take a crew to sea if he could not grant shore leave, and no crew would
be taken if it could never obtain it. . . .That business [the shipowner's] has sepa-
rated him from his usual places of association. By adding this separation to the restric-
tions of living as well as working aboard, it forges dual and unique compulsions for
seeking relief wherever it may be found. In sum, it is the ship's business which subjects
the seaman to the risks attending hours of relaxation in strange surroundings. Accord-
ingly, it is but reasonable that the business extend the same protections against injury
from them as it gives for other risks of the employment. . . . An obligation
[maintenance and cure] which thus originated and was shaped in response to the
needs of seamen for protection from the hazards and peculiarities of marine employ-
ment should not be narrowed to exclude from its scope characteristic and essential
elements of that work.
318 U.S. 731-35.
11. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367 (1932).
12. Comment, Maintenance and Cure, The Jones Act, and Land-Based Seamen, 46 TUL.
L. REv. 877 (1972).
13. Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951).
14. United States Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 355 (1971) (the seaman's status
as a "ward of the admiralty" in regard to wage claims is equally viable today).
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dance hall'5 and while swimming in a shallow pool.'6 Traditionally,
recovery requires only that the seaman be answerable to the call of
duty at the time of the injury, making recovery independent of the
time or situs of the injury'7 and limiting the remedy only to those
whose purpose for shore leave is the same as that of the blue-water
seaman.' 8 Recent recoveries by land-based seamen going to and
from work'9 have extended the coverage further, even though this
commuting time does not parallel "traditional" time ashore.
In order for the Mauk court's use of Aguilar and Waterman to be
supportive, it is necessary to find that when a seaman is within the
scope of maintenance and cure while on leave, he can be simultane-
ously brought within the "scope of his employment" for respondeat
superior purposes. According to Mauk's reasoning, if the employer
benefits sufficiently from granting "free time" ashore to his seamen
to uphold the obligation for maintenance and cure, then the em-
ployer can benefit enough to make him vicariously liable for any
shoreside torts committed by the seamen.2" The absence of admi-
ralty case law holding that tortious conduct to third parties by a
seaman on shore leave can be imputed to the shipowner by finding
the seaman "in the service of his ship" or "within the scope of his
employment" indicates, however, that the quantum of employer
benefit necessary for maintenance and cure and for vicarious liabil-
ity may be different.'
Shipowner liability to third parties injured by the tortious con-
duct of a seaman on shore leave has been imputed in only one
context, Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States.2 There the court
15. Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951).
16. Ellis v. American Hawaiian S.S. Co., 165 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1948).
17. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 516 (1949).
18. Sellers v. Dixilyn Corp., 433 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1970). For purposes of this
discussion, blue-water seaman means one who is required to live aboard a ship for substantial
periods of time.
19. See Vincent v. Harvey Well Serv., 441 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1971); Williamson v.
Western-Pacific Dredging Corp., 441 F.2d 65 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971).
20. For purposes of discussing the Mauk reasoning it is conceded that the football player
in pre-season camp has an employment situation paralleled by that of a blue-water seaman
and that the player's "free time" is functionally equivalent to the seaman's shore leave.
21. At the same time, no admiralty case has been found that specifically rejects the use
of maintenance and cure as a basis for vicarious liability.
22. 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968). It should be noted that the Mauk court did not cite
Bushey. As will be shown, the holding in Bushey is not supportive of Mauk and should not
be cited as precedent. Its importance is that it is the single admiralty case where a shipowner
has been found vicariously liable for a seaman's shoreside tort to a third party while the
seaman was on shore leave. While recovery has been permitted from a shipowner because of
1974
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did not analyze the seaman's conduct in terms of his "service" or
"scope of employment," but derivative liability was still estab-
lished. In Bushey, an inebriated sailor returning to his ship opened
the flood valves of the plaintiff's drydock, causing a ship to list and
damaging the drydock. The court found the United States liable
because the sailor's conduct was characteristic .of his normal activi-
ties in the discharge of his duties. The test used for vicarious liabil-
ity was the foreseeability of the sailor's conduct. The court, speaking
in terms of fairness, established liability for a foreseeable event.2
3
The court, realizing the new ground it was breaking, limited its
holding by dictum:
If Lane [the sailor] had set fire to the bar where he had been
imbibing or had caused an accident on the street while return-
ing to the drydock, the Government would not be liable; the
activities of the "enterprise" do not reach into areas where the
servant does not create risks different from those attendant on
the activities of the community in general.
24
Reading the maintenance and cure cases together with Bushey,
it appears that a seaman can be serving his ship for maintenance
and cure purposes by relaxing while on shore leave, but at the same
time not be within the scope of his employment for respondeat
injuries arising from the tortious conduct between shipmates, before Bushey, third party
recovery was not permitted. And at least one court has limited Bushey only to situations
where the employer was engaged in business dealings with the plaintiff. Schwartz v. Compag-
nie Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1968). Bushey is discussed to show that while
maintenance and cure cases should not be read to substantiate the holding of Mauk, neither
should any other theory abstracted from admiralty be so used. This is so whether or not
Bushey is read to require business dealings between the employer and the injured third party,
for no such relationship existed in Mauk.
23. Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968).
24. Id. at 172 (emphasis added). The justification for not extending vicarious liability to
cover the situations in this dictum has been commented on and found to be "rather strained."
See 82 HAav. L. Rav. 1568, 1574 (1969). The argument is that the predisposition of shoreside
seamen to become inebriated (not necessarily shared by football players) makes it equally
foreseeable that a seaman in such an intoxicated state would either set fire to the bar or would
cause an accident on the street. That rationale has been rejected where a seaman assaulted
a civilian drinking companion. Stewart v. Steamer Blue Trader, 428 F.2d 361 (1st Cir. 1970).
There the court said:
[W]hatever one might think of the principle established by [Bushey], extending
respondeat superior to foreseeable risks of a business enterprise, we would think long
before applying it to impose liability for an assault on a drinking companion by a
frolicking seaman.
Id. at 363.
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superior purposes. 5 Clearly, such a situation would occur if a non-
intoxicated seaman, while on shore leave, negligently drove a car
and injured himself and a third party. While the employer would
probably be obligated to pay maintenance and cure to the seaman,
it is improbable that the employer could be held vicariously liable
for the third party's injuries. Applying this reasoning to the employ-
ment situation of the professional football player during summer
training camp at a local college: if the player, while walking across
campus to his dormitory room where he was being housed during
camp, had punted a loose football through the college president's
window, injuring the president, the football club could be held vi-
cariously liable. But, if the player, returning to the camp from a
respite in the local town, had accidently injured a third party, vicar-
ious liability could not be found. In the former case, the player's
conduct is not so unforeseeable so as to relieve the team of liability;
in the latter, the conduct is too unforeseeable for derivative liability
to be found.
NON-ADMIRALTY CASE LAW
Murphey v. United States,26 a non-admiralty case, was an action
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act 27 which permits suits
against the United States for actions of its employees within the
scope of their employment. A staff sergeant of the United States
Army Air Corps, while driving an Army truck in a negligent manner,
caused the death of plaintiff's wife. The court, relying upon Aguilar,
analogized a soldier's employment in a mountain camp to that of
the seaman isolated in the monotonous surroundings of his ship.
The sergeant's authorized driving of the truck to transport the men
into town for entertainment and recreation was interpreted as fall-
ing within his "line of duty." Since transporting the men was an
authorized activity, the government conceded that this driving was
within the sergeant's scope of employment. The government con-
tended, however, that the sergeant's subsequent use of the truck to
25. The torts in both Bushey and Stewart involved seamen who had been drinking. An
injury occurring while a seaman was voluntarily intoxicated traditionally would relieve the
shipowner of his responsibility for maintenance and cure. It appears today that drinking by
the seaman may constitute such a deliberate act of indiscretion, but it is not dispositive of
the shipowner's obligation for maintenance and cure.
26. 179 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1950).
27. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 (1970).
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go to an "Indian ceremonial" after transporting the other soldiers
into town was not part of his military employment. The court found
that the sergeant's own destination was still within the town limits,
and therefore, still within the scope of his employment. 8 The im-
portance of the specific location of the "Indian ceremonial" was
emphasized by the court: "We are not holding that in any case
where the soldier is on a frolic of his own he can make the govern-
ment liable simply because he there found entertainment."' 9
When subsequently presented with a similar factual situation, the
same court held that respondeat superior did not apply to hold the
United States liable. In Williams v. United States,' the plaintiff
was injured when an Army vehicle struck the parked car in which
she was sitting. The plaintiff sought recovery from the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, relying entirely upon the
Murphey case.3 ' The court denied recovery and distinguished
Murphey, emphasizing that the sergeant in Murphey had specific
authorization and was acting under instructions while driving the
truck to find entertainment. Factually, it was found that the corpo-
ral in Williams was off-duty with an appropriate pass, seeking
entertainment, and was not using the vehicle to further any military
business. While there was a loose practice that allowed the soldiers
to use Army vehicles for their own purposes, this practice did not
constitute the permission or authorization present in Murphey. The
plaintiff's contention that employment in remote areas necessarily
brought off-duty time within a soldier's "line of duty" or "scope of
employment" was specifically rejected.32 Though Aguilar was cited,
the court noted that no cases in admiralty had been found support-
ing the imposition of vicarious liability for a tort committed by a
seaman recreating ashore. 3
28. It was disputed as to whether or not the "Indian ceremonial" was in the town of
Klamath. The sergeant deposed that it was; his superior deposed that it was just outside of
the town. The court decided that it was within the town limits, but noted that, even if it were
a short distance outside, the driving there would still have been within the permission
granted.
29. 179 F.2d at 745-46.
30. 215 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1954), vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 857 (1955), aff'd, 248
F,2d 492 (9th Cir. 1957).
31. 215 F.2d at 805.
32. Id. at 809.
33. Regarding the plaintiff's attempted use of Murphey the court said:
No cases in the field of Admiralty are cited (and probably not one could be found)
which support the view that a ship could be held legally liable in damages to a civilian
who was the victim of a wholly independent tort committed against his person by a
Vol. 13: 349
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COMMENTARY
To apply respondeat superior, the activity must be in the further-
ance of the employer's business; that is, the activity must be done
for the employer's benefit. It should be recognized that "off-duty,"
vacation, and "free time" are necessary to improve the morale and
efficiency of all employees, independent of the exact nature of the
employment situation. Improvement of employee morale and effi-
ciency obviously benefits the employer. Thus, when raised in the
context of an employee's "free time," the question of employer ben-
efit becomes "how much benefit did the employer obtain," not sim-
ply, "did the employer benefit." The Mauk court found the
quantum of benefit to be greater for an occupation which requires
the isolation of the employee and control by the employer. Finding
the blue-water sailor, the soldier isolated in a remote camp, or the
professional football player in summer training camp to be within
the scope of their employment for vicarious liability purposes may
be valid, but Aguilar, Waterman, and Murphey should not be read
as supporting that conclusion.
Aguilar and Waterman found sufficient benefit accruing to the
employer by his granting of shore leave to uphold his obligation for
maintenance and cure to a seaman injured while on shore leave. But
it appears that the courts have not found, in the granting of shore
leave, sufficient benefit to the employer in an admiralty context to
hold the employer vicariously liable. In Bushey, the single admi-
ralty case where vicarious liability was found for injury to a civilian
third party, the court's dictum specifically rejected an extension of
liability to cover the factual situation in Mauk. Thus, the use of
admiralty cases to find sufficient employer benefit for respondeat
superior purposes in a non-admiralty context (Mauk) is question-
able when such an expansion has not occurred in an admiralty con-
text. This is so whether vicarious liability is based upon an analogy
sailor while the latter was 'recreating' ashore while on leave from his ship.
Id. at 805. On being denied recovery in Williams, the plaintiff proceeded against her primary
employer in Self v. Hanson, 305 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1962). This action was brought under the
Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1970). Since
plaintiff's employer would have been liable to third parties if she had been the negligent
driver, she was within the scope of her employment for compensation recovery. The court
noted the remoteness of the area, but emphasized that the employer had provided vehicles
and gas for the employees' supervised and unsupervised use and that the company had
organized activities for the employees. Thus, the basis for recovery was not the mere granting
of "free time" by the employer, but rather the employer's involvement in aiding the employ-
ees' pursuit of diversion.
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drawn from maintenance and cure cases or upon some independent
theory such as foreseeability. In Murphey's use of Aguilar and
Waterman in a non-admiralty context to find sufficient employer
benefit, the court noted that the activity occurring during the "free
time" was specifically authorized. Williams showed that specific
authorization for the activity was essential to the holding. This
authorization is not present in Mauk.34
The denial of the defendant-team's motion for summary judg-
ment in Mauk permits a jury to find that the mere granting of "free
time" by the team brings the defendant-player within the scope of
his employment. As has been shown, such a conclusion based on the
authorities cited may be inappropriate. Though the Mauk court
found the relationship between the player and the team to be unique
and without parallel,35 this holding can be logically extended beyond
the isolated employment situation. The benefit that accrues to the
professional football team by granting time away from the training
camp is no greater than the benefit to a more conventional employer
in a highly competitive business who grants "free time" to his em-
ployees. It can be reasonably argued that equal employer benefits
result and that the holding in Mauk can be extended beyond the
isolated employment situation.
Fred R. Brown
SECURITIES- SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-SECTION
10(b)-SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION RULE 10b-5
-BIRNBAUM RULE-The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has disavowed the purchaser-seller limitation
known as the Birnbaum rule and has held that any person may seek
private relief under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, if he has, in his
capacity as an investor, suffered significant injury as a direct conse-
quence of a fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties.
34. The authorization in Williams and Mauk consisted solely of being given time-off away
from the job. The specific authorization in Murphey which was absent in Williams and Mauk
was more than the mere granting of "free time" by the employer. Rather, it was the authority
to use the Army vehicle, which was involved in the accident, to find recreation in the nearby
town.
35. 367 F. Supp. at 971.
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